Proceedings of the 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2021

Tracing CAPEC Attack Patterns from CVE Vulnerability Information
using Natural Language Processing Technique
Kenta Kanakogi
Waseda University
kanakogi-soft@fuji.waseda.jp

Hironori Washizaki
Waseda University
washizaki@waseda.jp

Yoshiaki Fukazawa
Waseda University
fukazawa@waseda.jp

Shinpei Ogata
Shinshu University
ogata@cs.shinshu-u.ac.jp

Takao Okubo
Institute of Information Security
okubo@iisec.ac.jp

Takehisa Kato
Hitachi,Ltd.
takehisa.kato.wx@hitachi.com

Hideyuki Kanuka
Hitachi,Ltd.
hideyuki.kanuka.dv@hitachi.com

Atsuo Hazeyama
Tokyo Gakugei University
hazeyama@u-gakugei.ac.jp

Nobukazu Yoshioka
National Institute of Informatics
nobukazu@nii.ac.jp

Abstract
To effectively respond to vulnerabilities,
information must not only be collected efficiently and
quickly but also the vulnerability and the attack
techniques must be understood. A security knowledge
repository can collect such information. The Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) provides known
vulnerabilities of products, while the Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the
common attributes and approaches employed by
adversaries to exploit known weaknesses. Because the
information in these two repositories is not directly
related, identifying the related CAPEC attack
information from the CVE vulnerability information is
challenging. One proposed method traces some related
CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID through Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE). However, it is not applicable to all
patterns. Here, we propose a method to automatically
trace the related CAPEC-IDs from CVE-ID using TFIDF and Doc2Vec. Additionally, we experimentally
confirm that TF-IDF is more accurate than Doc2vec.

1. Introduction
System administrators spend a lot of time dealing
with vulnerabilities due in part to their sheer volume. To
effectively respond and mitigate vulnerabilities, not
only must vulnerability information be collected
efficiently and quickly but also the vulnerability and the
attack techniques utilizing the vulnerability must be
understood. For example, when performing a
penetration test, it is essential to refer to information
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/71462
978-0-9981331-4-0
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

about known vulnerabilities and attacks.
To collect such information, knowledge repositories
on cyber-security issues may be used.
Public
repositories include Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) [1] and Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [2]. CVE lists
common identifiers for known vulnerability information.
CAPEC is a dictionary of common identifiers for attack
patterns employed by adversaries to exploit weaknesses.
CVE and CAPEC should both be used to implement
an efficient penetration test. A vulnerability scanner can
automatically detect CVE-IDs, but the CVE does not
contain attack information. Therefore, we add attack
information using the CAPEC attack patterns. Because
CVE and CAPEC are not directly related, identifying
the related CAPEC attack information from the CVE
vulnerability information is difficult, especially for
those without experience. Currently, Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [3], which is a list of
common identifiers of types of security weaknesses, is
employed to identify the relationships between CVE and
CAPEC (Fig. 1). “Weakness Enumeration” contains
information about the relationship between the CVE
vulnerability information and CWE. "Related Attack
Patterns" includes the CAPEC attack pattern
information related to the CWE information. CWE can
trace the related CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID. In this paper,
we refer to this method as the “conventional method”.
The conventional method has two issues:
 It cannot trace some patterns of the related
CAPEC-IDs from CVE-IDs when using CWE.
Sections 3.2 and 5.3 mention specific patterns and
conditions.
 Mappings between repositories are created
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manually. Manual mapping cannot handle the
growing amount of vulnerability information. In
addition, the number of mapping failures is rising.
Currently, CVE and CAPEC are not explicitly
mapped. It is preferable for the authors of CVE-ID to
map it directly to CAPEC. However, accurate mapping
is costly and difficult. This paper aims to trace the
related CAPEC-ID directly from the CVE-ID. Our
method suggests which CAPEC-ID should be related to
a given CVE-ID. It does not provide a definitive “best”
CAPEC-ID. Herein we calculate the similarity between
CVE descriptions and CAPEC descriptions.
We propose two approaches to calculate similarity:
Doc2Vec [4] and TF-IDF [5]. TF-IDF calculates the
similarity of sentences by the number of occurrences of
words, whereas Doc2Vec calculates the similarity of
sentences by the distributed representation of sentences.
We chose a representative similarity measure. These
methods have been employed in previous studies [6], [7],
but they have not been accurately evaluated or directly
compared. Here, these two approaches are compared to
the conventional one by tracing the related CAPEC-IDs
from 44 CVE-IDs. Although other approaches can
measure similarity such as LSI and Word Mover's
Distance, evaluating these remains a future work. Our
approach is described in detail in Section 4.
This paper aims to answer the following three
Research Questions (RQs):
RQ1. How accurately can the relationships of
security repositories be traced from CVE-ID to
CAPEC-ID? This question assesses the trace
accuracy of CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID.
RQ2. When using similarity based on natural
language processing and machine learning, how
accurate is the tracing from CVE-ID to CAPEC-ID?
This question verifies the effectiveness of our
proposed approach.

Figure 1. Relationships between security
knowledge repositories

RQ3. Which of the three evaluated methods
provides the best results? This question determines
the most effective method among the conventional
method and the two methods proposed in RQ2.
The contributions of this paper are twofold:
1. We clarify the mapping accuracy between
security knowledge repositories.
2. Our method can easily identify CAPEC-IDs that
are mapping candidates and assist in the mapping
process.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces related works. Section 3 provides the
background and motivating example. Section 4 explains
our approach. Section 5 describes the results of the
experiment and discusses the RQs. Section 6 presents
our conclusions and future work.

2. Related Work
Previous studies have investigated vulnerabilities
contained in repositories [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. One
study, which examined only the Software Defined
Networking and Network Functions Virtualization
vulnerability, also employed TF-IDF [6]. However,
repositories have yet to be comprehensively evaluated.
Although [7] had a similar objective as this study, they
used Doc2vec without an explicit assessment, which
made it difficult to evaluate the performance of the
matching process.
Another study automatically mapped CVE to
CAPEC and ATT&CK to find appropriate mitigation
measures [8]. They created a neural network model with
automatic classification in an attempt to realize a deep
learning model that groups CWEs into CAPECs.
However, they only suggested a method. On the other
hand, this study conducts experiments with 44 CVE-IDs
and prepares the correct CAPEC-ID.
Some studies examine the usage of topic modeling
and natural language processing to extract hidden topics
from the textual description of each attack pattern and
learn the parameters of a topic model [11], [12].
Although we performed a simple natural language
process, the topic analysis performed in these other
papers is a useful reference for future applications of
topic analysis.
The literature reports applications of topic analysis
[13], [14]. In particular, one study proposes a hybrid
method combining TF-IDF-weighted Doc2Vec and TFIDF-weighted VSM [13]. This approach should be
useful to improve the similarity measurement in this
study.
Other studies investigated vulnerability ontology
models [15], [16], [17]. They researched vulnerability
models based on well-known public databases in the
field of security such as CVE, CWE, and CAPEC.
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Several studies have investigated security measures
using security knowledge repositories. One study
created a vulnerability management ontology that ranks
attacks by security knowledge repositories [18].
Another study defined a framework to prioritize
vulnerabilities [19]. Several studies have focused on
mining methods and information retrieval for a security
knowledge repository [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. These
papers mined each repository using their relationships.
However, verifying the accuracy of the identified
relationships were beyond the scope of these studies.
Herein we evaluate the accuracy of the relationships
between repositories.
Our method can propose attack patterns for a
Penetration Tester. Several papers on penetration testing
have introduced the Vulnerability Assessment and
Penetration Test process [25], [26], [27]. Similar to this
study, the authors of [27] performed penetration testing
using CVE and CAPEC. Unlike our method, their
method used the relationships between knowledge
repositories.

3. Background
3.1. Security Knowledge repository
Many repositories disclose information about
vulnerabilities. Here, a security knowledge repository is
described.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).
CVE is a dictionary of common identifiers for known
vulnerabilities. It includes more than 130,000
vulnerabilities.
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [28]. NVD
is the U.S. government repository of standards-based
vulnerability management data, which is represented
using the Security Content Automation Protocol
(SCAP). NVD is fully synchronized with CVE. It
includes the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE),
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE), and other
related database information.
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). CWE is a
list of common software security weaknesses. It
identifies categories of vulnerabilities. Each CWE-ID is
assigned to create a hierarchical structure. Each CWEID is documented with a panoply of information,
including a description, related Attack Pattern (CAPECID), etc.
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC). CAPEC is a comprehensive
dictionary of attack patterns employed by adversaries to
exploit known weaknesses. Attack patterns are
descriptions of common attributes and approaches used
by attackers to exploit known weaknesses. CAPEC

helps understand the specific elements of an attack and
how to prevent a successful attack.

3.2. Motivating Example
Although CWE can trace some of the related
CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID, it cannot trace all patterns.
An example is CVE-2018-18442, which is a
vulnerability related to a weakness due to flooding of
network packets. The description of CVE-2018-18442
is as follows:
D-Link DCS-825L devices with firmware 1.08 do
not employ a suitable mechanism to prevent denialof-service (DoS) attacks. An attacker can harm the
device availability (i.e., live-online video/audio
streaming) by using the hping3 tool to perform an
IPv4 flood attack. Verified attacks includes SYN
flooding, UDP flooding, ICMP flooding, and SYNACK flooding. [29]
There is an attack pattern identifier for Flooding in
CAPEC-125. However, CVE-2018-18442 is also
related to CWE-20. Because CAPEC-125 cannot be
traced from CWE-20, CAPEC-125 cannot be identified.
By tracing the relationship between security knowledge
repositories, we found that the correct CAPEC-ID could
not be identified. The exact number of CVE-IDs that
cannot be mapped to CAPEC via CWE is unknown.
Since the issue is the use of CWE, it is preferable to
directly trace from CVE to CAPEC. This is our
motivation. Section 5.2 also references problems about
CVE-IDs, which are impossible to map to CAPEC via
CWE.

4. Tracing method from CVE-ID to
CAPEC-ID
We considered how to trace CAPEC from CVE
directly. We used similarity to trace the related CAPECIDs from a CVE-ID. Figure 2 overviews our method,
which consists of three steps. First, a CVE-ID is inputted.
For example, CVE-2018-18442 is used as the input data
in Fig. 2. Second, the similarity between the description
of the inputted CVE-ID and that of all CAPEC-IDs is
calculated. Finally, the CAPEC documents are sorted by
the similarity score.
We investigated two methods for the similarity
measurements: TF-IDF and Doc2Vec. TF-IDF
evaluates the importance of words in a document. It is a
simple natural language process and is typically used to
search for similar documents. On the other hand,
Doc2Vec creates a paragraph vector and calculates the
similarity. A machine learning model is built through
averaging, combining, and estimating. Therefore, the
results of the natural language processing depend on the
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Figure 2. Overview of our method
machine learning model.
We describe each approach in detail below. Both
approaches find the related CAPEC-ID in CVE-201818442. Eventually, we aim to identify CAPEC-125 from
the CAPEC-ID.

4.1. Tracing method based on Doc2Vec

Table 1. List of CAPEC-ID rankings related to
CVE-2018-18442 (Doc2Vec)
Rank
CAPEC-ID
Similarity
1
49
0.199
2
104
0.196
3
291
0.188
4
27
0.187
5
528
0.185
6
331
0.184
7
300
0.181
8
168
0.177
9
486
0.174
10
462
0.173

… …

Doc2Vec uses the genism [30] doc2vec python
library. The embedding vectors obtained from the text
are used to calculate the similarity using the cosine
similarity. A value close to 1 indicates similarity,
whereas a value close to 0 indicates dissimilarity, which
is typical for cosine trigonometric functions. Two
models have been proposed to create a paragraph vector:
The Distributed Memory Model of Paragraph Vectors
(PV-DM) and the Distributed Bag of Words version of
Paragraph Vector (PV-DBOW) Here, we use the PVDBOW. DBOW ignores the word order, forcing the
model to predict words randomly sampled from the
paragraph in the output. Although PV-DM is more
accurate because it considers the word order, we felt that

the word order was not relevant when comparing the
CVE and CAPEC descriptions. For example, the CVE
describes it as a “brute force password attack”, while
CAPEC describes it as “brute force attack on passwords”
or “Password Brute Forcing”. Figure 3 shows the flow
of the Doc2Vec approach using CVE-2018-18442 as an
example. Table 1 shows the final results. The algorithm
of the Doc2Vec approach is as follows:
STEP 1: Preprocess Data. The training data is the
text of the Description section in CVE and CAPEC. All
training data are given a Paragraph_id. There are 515
CAPEC-IDs (CAPEC-434 and 435 are excluded
because their Description sections are blank). Each
CAPEC-ID is given a Paragraph_id from 0 to 514.
There are 131684 CVE-IDs. Each CVE-ID is given a
Paragraph_id from 515 to 132198.
STEP 2: Create a Doc2Vec model. The formed
training data is used to train the Doc2Vec model. Then
a distributed representation of all the training data can
be acquired.
STEP 3: Use the variance representation acquired in
step 2 to find the similarity. Using the
“self.wv.n_similarity” method [30] provides the
similarity
between
paragraphs.
The
“self.wv.n_similarity” method gives two Paragpaph_id.
This is the input data for our method. In Fig. 3, the
Paragraph_id of CVE-2018-18442 is set to 1200. Then
the Paragraph_ids, which range from 0 to 514, are
inputted individually.
STEP 4: Obtain the similarity and sort. STEP 3
produces the similarity between the input Paragraph_ids.
Consequently, the similarity scores between the
inputted CVE-ID (CVE-2018-18442) and all CAPECIDs are determined. Then the scores are sorted in
descending order. The ID with a higher rank is the
related CAPEC-ID.

198

125

0.0659

515

503

-0.131
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Table 2. List of CAPEC-ID rankings related to
CVE-2018-18442 (TF-IDF)
Rank
CAPEC-ID
Similarity
1
49
0.199
2
104
0.196
3
291
0.188
4
147
0.140
5
488
0.129
6
184
0.122
7
469
0.121
8
594
0.116
9
125
0.100
10
308
0.979
…

515

650

0

Figure 3. Overview of the tracing method
based on Doc2Vec

4.2. Tracing method based on TF-IDF
In TF-IDF, we use scikit-learn [31]. Herein, we use
the "TfidfVectorizer" method. Figure 4 shows the flow
of the TF-IDF approach using CVE-2018-18442 as an
example. Table 2 shows the final results. The algorithm
of the TF-IDF approach is as follows:
STEP1: Input Data. Input all CAPEC descriptions
and the description of one CVE-ID as a corpus.
STEP 2: Preprocess Data. Preprocess the corpus
with the most common words removing punctuation,
tokenization, and lemmatization.
STEP 3: Obtain a matrix of TF-IDF features.
Convert a collection of corpuses to a matrix of TF-IDF
features using “TfidfVectorizer”.
STEP 4: Get the TF-IDF scores. Use “fit_transform”
to learn the matrix of TF-IDF features and return the TFIDF-weighted document-term matrix.
STEP 5: Sort the TF-IDF scores. STEP 4 produces
the TF-IDF scores between the inputted CVE-ID (CVE2018-18442) and all CAPEC-IDs. The scores are sorted
in descending order, and the ID with the higher rank is
the related CAPEC-ID.

Figure 4. Overview of the tracing method
based on TF-IDF

5. Experiments and Results
We prepared 44 CVE-IDs and used them as input
data. We tested whether we could trace CAPEC-IDs
related to each of the 44 CVE-IDs. In the evaluation, we
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calculated the Recall@10. Recall@n indicates the
proportion of relevant items found in the top-n
recommendations. The RQs questions were answered
using the tracing results of the 44 CVE-IDs.

5.1. 44CVE-IDs
CAPEC contains the Example Instance field, which
lists the specific vulnerabilities targeted by this exploit
instance of the attack. CVE-ID may be listed in this field.
Example Instance field contained 7 CVE-IDs in 1999, 4
CVE-IDs in 2000, 4 CVE-IDs in 2001, 2 CVE-IDs in
2002, 1 CVE-ID in 2003, 3 CVE-IDs in 2004, 3 CVEIDs in 2005, 13 CVE-IDs in 2006, 4 CVE-IDs in 2007,
2 CVE-IDs in 2010, and 1 CVE-ID in 2016. Hence,
there are a total of 44 CVE-IDs listed. The average
number of words is 36. The median is 34. The maximum
is 81, and the minimum is 9. To evaluate the correctness
of the tracing results using our method requires correct
data, we selected these 44 CVE-IDs. If a CVE-ID listed
in the Example Instance of a CAPEC-ID is used as input
data, whether the corresponding CAPEC-ID is
successfully traced can be verified. Originally, the
mapping from CVE to CAPEC is many-to-many, but in
this experiment, we assume that it is many-to-one.

5.2. RQ 1. How accurately can the relationships
of security repositories be traced from CVE-ID
to CAPEC-ID?
When tracing the relationships between repositories,
we successfully traced 2 of the 44 CVE-IDs using the
conventional method. This low accuracy is attributed to
the relationship between CVE (NVD) and CWE. NVD
is fully synchronized with CVE. We analyzed the
accuracy of the mapping between CVE (NVD) and
CWE.
The NVD webpage contains a section called
“Weakness Enumeration”. This section provides
information about the relationship between CVE-ID and
CWE. There are four patterns of information in this
relationship. Information in the first pattern is written
with a CWE-ID. Information in the second pattern is
written with multiple CWE-IDs. The information in the
third pattern is written “NVD-CWE-Other”.
Information in the fourth pattern is written with “NVDCWE-noinfo”. In the cases of “NVD-CWE-Other”
and “NVD-CWE-noinfo”, information cannot be traced
to CAPEC-ID because it is not mapped to CWE-ID.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of information for these
relationships. Approximately 30% of CVE-IDs are not
mapped to CWE-IDs.
When aggregated by year, the percentage of CVEID mapped to CWE-ID has increased each year (Fig. 6).

In particular, the percentage of CVE-IDs mapped to
CWE-ID has increased dramatically since 2008. The
increasing percentage of CVE-IDs mapped to CWE-ID
highlights the importance of accurate mapping of CWEID. However, bias is a problem. There are 839 CWEIDs, of which only 149 are used to map CVE-IDs.
Figure 7 shows the distribution for the top 15 mapped
CWE-IDs listed.
Figure 7 focuses on CWE-20 and CWE-200. These
two CWE-IDs have very high abstraction levels,
indicating that many CAPEC-IDs are listed in the
Related Attack Pattern section. CWE-20 has a
relationship with 51 CAPEC-IDs, while CWE-200 has
a relationship with 58 CAPEC-IDs. Due to these large
numbers, it is difficult to identify which is the correct
CAPEC-ID.

Figure 5. Percentage of CVE-IDs not mapped
to CWE

Figure 6. Changes in the percentage of CVE-ID
that is mapped to CWE-ID

Figure 7. Vulnerability distribution by CWE-ID
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We analyzed CWE-20 in detail. CWE-20 is the
parent node of the path traversal, buffer error, XSS, and
injection. It covers a lot of weaknesses. The reason is
described on the CWE-20 webpage:
The “input validation” term is extremely common,
but it is used in many different ways. In some cases
its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness
or otherwise hide chaining and composite
relationships.
Some people use “input validation” as a general
term that covers many different neutralization
techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate,
such as filtering, canonicalization, and escaping.
Others use the term in a more narrow context to
simply mean “checking if an input conforms to
expectations without changing it.” [32]
As shown above, it is easy to understand why CWE20 is often mapped from CVE-ID. However, CVE-IDs
mapped for this reason cannot provide useful
vulnerability information from CWE.
As discussed in Section 2.2, we introduced a pattern
that CAPEC-ID cannot identify. CVE-2014-0160,
which is a vulnerability about Buffer Overread, is
another example. The description of CVE-2014-0160 is
as follows:
The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in
OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g do not properly
handle Heartbeat Extension packets, which allows
remote attackers to obtain sensitive information
from process memory via crafted packets that
trigger a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by
reading private keys, related to d1_both.c and
t1_lib.c, aka the Heartbleed bug. [33]
CAPEC-540 contains an attack pattern identifier for
Buffer Overread. There is a weakness identifier for
Buffer Overread in CWE-126. However, the “Weakness
Enumeration” section of CVE-2014-0160 says CWE119 (Buffer Errors). Hence, CAPEC-540 cannot be
traced from CWE-119. Why is it mapped to CWE-119?
CVE-2014-0160 involves multiple weaknesses in
CWE-125, 126, and 130. These three CWE-IDs are
recognized as identifiers related to the Heartbleed bug.
Despite this fact, we believe that the CWE-119 mapping
is because it allows for a single identifier to indicate the
presence of multiple weaknesses. Hence, we found that
the CWE-ID described in Weakness Enumeration does
not characterize an attacker's use of a vulnerability to
attack.
Result of RQ 1. Only 2 out of the 44 CVE-IDs
were traced to the related CAPEC-ID. Useful
information about the attack that can be traced
is inaccurate.

5.3. RQ 2. When using similarity based on
natural language processing and machine
learning, how accurate is the tracing from CVEID to CAPEC-ID?
The respective results of Doc2Vec and TF-IDF are
described below. We traced the related CAPEC-IDs
from the 44 CVE-IDs using the method described in
Section 4.
Result of RQ 2. Doc2Vec traced 4 of the 44 CVEIDs to the related CAPEC-ID. In contrast, TFIDF traced 33 of the 44 CVE-IDs to the related
CAPEC-ID.

5.4. RQ 3. Which of three evaluated methods
provides the best results?
Figure 8 plots the experimental results for the Recall
to trace related CAPEC-IDs from CVE-ID by the
proposed method. TF-IDF yielded the best results. It
successfully traced 33 of the 44 CVE-IDs. As a result,
we could trace related CAPEC-IDs from CVE-ID in a
keyword-based search. The CVE description word
count does not affect the NLP approach. Currently, the
search scope is narrow as it is limited to the text in the
Description section of CAPEC. However, the accuracy
of TF-IDF should improve upon widening the search
scope. In addition, instead of relying on the TF-IDF
measure, we would like to aggregate the TF-IDF
measure and use the overlap score [34].
We believe that the corpus is a factor for why TFIDF was more accurate than Doc2Vec. TF-IDF is better
suited for smaller, more focused corpora. On the other
hand, Doc2Vec is better for handling large corpora that
span many topics. In this study, the accuracy of TF-IDF
improved because the topic was limited to security.
However, modifying the training data may enhance
Doc2Vec.

Figure 8. Recall for each approach
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Herein all the text in the Description section of CVE
and the Description section of CAPEC was trained as
training data. The text in the Description section of CVE
is often canned, which leads to biased training data. We
believe that this bias decreased the accuracy. The reason
for the low accuracy of the conventional method, as
confirmed in RQ1, is the poor accuracy of the
relationships between repositories. Most of the 44 CVEIDs handled in the experiment were “NVD-CWEOther”. Hence, it cannot be traced to CAPEC-ID
because it is not mapped to CWE-ID, resulting in a
lower recall. Changing CVE-ID in the experiment
should alter the result of the conventional method.
Result of RQ 3. All three methods can realize a
trace, but the TF-IDF is the most accurate.

6. Conclusion
Herein we propose an approach to trace the related
CAPEC-ID directly from CVE-ID. The conventional
tracing method uses the relationships between each
repository. However, not only is manual tracing
required, but accuracy may also be an issue. Our
proposed tracing method uses similarity. The similarity
between CVE-ID and CAPEC-ID is calculated using
two different measurements: Doc2Vec and TF-IDF. TFIDF had a higher accuracy, but the results suggest that
the Doc2Vec model can be improved.
Our method does not currently address the severity
of each vulnerability. However, this is a topic for future
work. Additionally, we need to enhance the accuracy of
each approach. The first step is to expand the search
scope to include text from other sections as well as that
in the Description section. Moreover, the training data
in Doc2Vec needs to be modified. The second step is to
improve the accuracy of our training data using news
articles about security as training data. Although we
used CAPEC in this paper, other attack patterns are
based on pattern language. In the future, we plan to
evaluate attack patterns other than CAPEC as candidates
for tracing. Moreover, we would like to improve the
accuracy and increase the amount of information to
provide useful cybersecurity information. By collecting,
identifying, and analyzing data directly from security
knowledge repositories, we hope to develop the
proposed method into comprehensive and proactive
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) research [35], [36] or
extend the tracking by organizing the relationships
between security concepts with metamodel [37].
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